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EU Water Governance: Striking the Right Balance between Regulatory
Flexibility and Enforcement?
Olivia O. Green 1, Ahjond S. Garmestani 1, Helena F. M. W. van Rijswick 2 and Andrea M. Keessen 2
ABSTRACT. Considering the challenges and threats currently facing water management and the exacerbation of uncertainty
by climate change, the need for flexible yet robust and legitimate environmental regulation is evident. The European Union took
a novel approach toward sustainable water resource management with the passage of the EU Water Framework Directive in
2000. The Directive promotes sustainable water use through long-term protection of available water resources, progressively
reduces discharges of hazardous substances in ground and surface waters, and mitigates the effects of floods and droughts. The
lofty goal of achieving good status of all waters requires strong adaptive capacity, given the large amounts of uncertainty in
water management. Striking the right balance between flexibility in local implementation and robust and enforceable standards
is essential to promoting adaptive capacity in water governance, yet achieving these goals simultaneously poses unique difficulty.
Applied resilience science reveals a conceptual framework for analyzing the adaptive capacity of governance structures that
includes multiple overlapping levels of control or coordination, information flow horizontally and vertically, meaningful public
participation, local capacity building, authority to respond to changed circumstances, and robust monitoring, system feedback,
and enforcement. Analyzing the Directive through the lens of resilience science, we highlight key elements of modern European
water management and their contribution to the resilience of the system and conclude that the potential lack of enforcement and
adequate feedback of monitoring results does not promote managing for resilience. However, the scale-appropriate governance
aspects of the EU approach promotes adaptive capacity by enabling vertical and horizontal information flow, building local
capacity, and delegating control at multiple relevant scales.
Key Words: adaptive governance; environmental law; European Union; resilience; Water Framework Directive
INTRODUCTION
Conceptual framework
Resilience is the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance
and maintain essentially the same structures and processes
(Holling 1973). Human influence on ecosystem resilience can
hardly be overestimated, and the concept of social-ecological
resilience describes the capacity of linked social and
ecological systems to absorb and adapt to change (Folke et al.
2004, Adger et al. 2005). Social-ecological resilience depends
upon the interactions between processes and structures at
multiple scales (Gunderson and Holling 2002). Thus, scale is
a critical consideration in managing for resilience (Peterson
et al. 1998), but the current conception of resilience does not
provide a blueprint that can be used with regard to scalespecific conditions (Garmestani et al. 2009). Thus, couching
environmental management within the context of a scaledependent theory, panarchy theory, can help to develop sound
environmental management (Benson and Garmestani 2011a).
Panarchy theory improves upon hierarchical models because,
unlike top-down control envisioned in traditional hierarchies,
connectivity between adaptive cycles in a panarchy provides
feedback and resources from levels above or below. In a
hierarchy, lower-level patterns and processes are dominated
from above. To address environmental problems in complex
systems, panarchy-based governance differs from hierarchical
nesting in that conditions can trigger bottom-up, i.e., cross-

scale cascading, system change (Garmestani et al. 2009). This
nested governance model of social-ecological systems
acknowledges their inherently dynamic nature. The EU Water
Framework Directive’s (WFD or Directive) nested approach
to governance at multiple scales reflects the complexity of
managing a dynamic system.
Adaptive governance incorporates formal institutions,
informal networks, and individuals at multiple scales for
collaborative environmental management (Folke et al. 2005).
Adaptive governance shares management power and
responsibilities and promotes collaborative, participatory
processes (Green et al. 2013). Adaptive governance depends
upon adaptive comanagement, and, in turn, adaptive
comanagement relies upon social networks for success. Social
networks are key because of their capacity to promote
innovation, facilitate communication between entities, and
foster the flexibility necessary for successful environmental
management, which requires interplay between fluid
ecological systems and rigid institutions (Folke et al. 2005,
Green et al. 2012).
Multiple frameworks for evaluating the adaptive capacity of
governance structures exist in the literature, and we have
selected a modified version of Cosens (2010) as the basis of
our evaluation. Cosens (2010) identifies five critical elements
of adaptive governance:
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1. multiple overlapping levels of control with one level of
control or strong coordination at the relevant social-ecological
scale;
2. horizontal and vertical flow of information and coordination
of decision-making;
3. meaningful public participation;
4. local capacity building; and
5. authority to respond to changes across a range of scenarios.
In addition, we add two critical elements:
6. monitoring and system feedback; and
7. enforcement.
We build upon Cosens (2010) because a key factor in adaptive
governance is monitoring, which enables continuous learning
and feedback. Assessing the physical characteristics, human
impacts, and changes therein is a sound adaptive approach
when done at the appropriate scale. Adaptive governance
requires system feedback in real time and, as Cosens (2010)
illustrates, authority and legitimacy to act on the basis of
monitoring data.
Background on the EU Water Framework Directive
The European Union is neither a traditional international
organization nor a federal state but a supranational
organization made up of 27 member states with unique
implications for its organization and integrated legal order
(Jans et al. 2007). Environmental regulation is a field of shared
competency between member states and the European Union,
which means that the member states share sovereignty with
the European Union over water law and policy. The European
Union has the power to adopt binding legislation for all
member states and the power to enter into international
agreements, while the member states retain ultimate
sovereignty because the European Union cannot act outside
of the authority granted it by the member states.
Under the EU Treaty, the European Union regulates only what
is absolutely necessary with respect to international issues,
such as the creation of markets between member states and
transboundary environmental protection. The choice to
develop scaled-up environmental regulations via EU
legislation rather than leaving water management to the
discretion of member states is based on the subsidiarity and
proportionality principles (Jans et al. 2007). These principles
imply that the European Union may only take action if and
insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be
sufficiently achieved at the nation scale, and therefore the issue
is better dealt with at supranational scale. This legal order of
acquis communautaire, the EU body of law, attempts to
achieve regulatory harmony across member states through
required adoption of EU rules and has been framed as a more
passive form of reterritorialization than outright border
redelineation (Johnson 2012).

As in other environmental policies, the preferred legal
instrument in water policy is the directive. Directives must be
implemented in the national legal orders of member states in
a way that guarantees the objectives of the legislation are fully
attained, while the choice of the means to realize them is to a
large extent left to member states (Jans and Vedder 2008).
With respect to panarchy, the directive rescales governance
along hydrologic boundaries, i.e., watersheds. Rescaling
results in a hybrid form of jurisdictional authority:
supranational objectives, i.e., directives, carried out through
state policies, i.e., state legislation. Consolidated decision
making at the supranational level tends to de-emphasize
national borders, as some have termed “postsovereign
environmental governance,” while instead focusing on natural
boundaries (Karkkainen 2004). However, upon enactment
member states are responsible for transposition of the directive
in their own legal order and for its application and
enforcement, thus empowering states to dictate the specifics
of how to achieve the goals of the directive.
The European Commission supervises state efforts because
the member states are accountable to the commission for
compliance with EU regulatory obligations (Jans et al. 2007).
The commission takes preventative action by, for example,
establishing performance score boards and guidance
documents and takes enforcement action by bringing member
states before the European Court of Justice to face financial
sanctions for noncompliance. Because of the inherent
flexibility granted in directive implementation from state to
state, oversight poses challenges, and enforcement lags
(Rechtschaffen 2007). Weak or unambitious implementation
may escape enforcement action because of the subjectivity
inherent in the determination as opposed to enforcement
actions for nontransposition of EU law into national law,
which is objectively determined, i.e., law is either transposed
or not. The burden of proof lies with the Commission, but the
Commission has limited capacity for monitoring the
application and implementation of EU law, relying mostly on
complaints and national implementation reports (Gil Ibanez
1999). Consequently, there are considerable differences
between member states in the extent to which they comply
with EU environmental obligations (e.g., EC 2008).
The earliest EU water legislation only contained standards for
water bodies used as drinking water sources. Only five years
later, in 1980, EU water legislation expanded to include
binding quality standards for the protection of drinking water,
fisheries, shellfish beds, bathing waters, and groundwater. In
addition, directives were created to reduce water pollution
from municipal, industrial, and agricultural sources by setting
emission, i.e., effluent, standards for discharges (Jans and
Vedder 2008). This sector-specific approach was abandoned
in 2000 in favor of an integrated, river basin-specific approach
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that would be better able to deal with regional variation and
uncertainty and changing environmental, economic, and
societal need.
The WFD marked a new beginning by prescribing river basin
management, expanding the scope of water protection to all
water bodies, promoting sustainable use of water, tentatively
linking water management with other policies (Van Rijswick
2003, Keessen et al. 2010a), allowing for regional and
multilevel goal setting, improving public participation,
introducing ecological standards, and facilitating adaptation
to climate change (Termeer et al. 2011). Article 4 of the
Directive sets the environmental objectives with separate
goals and standards for surface waters and groundwater.
Surface waters must achieve good chemical and ecological
status by 2015; groundwater should at that time be in a good
chemical and quantitative status. Chemical goals are set at the
EU level for the most hazardous substances and at the national
level for less hazardous substances. Ecological goals are
established at the sub-basin level.
The Directive is characterized by its cyclical planning process,
based on a programmatic approach to protect and improve the
status of river basins. The results of the assessment of the
physical status and human impacts on a water system are part
of the river basin management plans that have to be reviewed
and updated every six years. Further, a program of measures
must be established to tackle the causes of not achieving good
status of waters. This program of measures is based on a
combined approach for point and diffuse sources and
combines environmental quality standards with effluent
control measures. It integrates the mandatory measures from
other EU water legislation, such as discharge controls based
on best available technologies, effluent limit values, and in the
case of diffuse impacts, best environmental management
practices. Member states may expand their program of
measures by adding voluntary measures like education,
market-based instruments, covenants, and various other
practical measures, e.g., desalination.
DISCUSSION
Multiple overlapping levels of control with one level of
control or strong coordination at the scale of the socialecological system
The decentralized nature of directive implementation allows
member states flexibility in developing scale-specific water
management policy, and scale-specific solutions are crucial
to adaptive governance (Green et al. 2013). The Directive
provides flexibility for developing water policy at the
appropriate level, because geophysical circumstances differ
per region (Keessen et al. 2010b). The most innovative aspect
of the WFD is its river basin approach whereby water
management is oriented based on hydrologic, not political,
boundaries (Moss 2012). This central organizing principle

guides the development of all goals and standards. The WFD
mandates that the appropriate social-ecological system is the
river basin in Articles 3 and 13. Likewise, strong coordination
at the river basin scale is obligatory. The structure of
overlapping levels of control vary by member state, as each
state implements the WFD through different institutions, but
all river basins are governed, at the highest level, by the
European Union. Below that, a member state may create a new
state-wide water management agency, or revise an existing
one, to coordinate or oversee the work of river basin districts,
as is the case in England and Wales (White and Howe 2003).
Within established river basin districts, management at the
sub-basin scale may be more appropriate and such schemes
are within the scope of the WFD.
Horizontal and vertical information transfer and
coordination of decision making
The institutional design of EU water management and
governance takes an integrated river basin management
approach. By removing jurisdictional barriers, integrated river
basin management emphasizes coordination across borders,
and if fully implemented, strong horizontal and vertical
information flow. Member states must identify river basins
and assign them to individual river basin districts (Article 3).
Each member state must ensure appropriate administrative
arrangements, which include the identification of appropriate
competent authorities, both on the national and the
international level because many river basins are
transboundary. EU water management therefore depends on
cooperation and shared responsibilities for the attainment of
its goals by way of shared goal setting, planning, and risk
assessment.
As in other EU policies, member states have discretion in
assigning the competent authorities because they implement
EU law through their own national legal order, i.e., procedural
autonomy, and in making use of their own civil servants, i.e.,
institutional autonomy. The Directive term “appropriate”
nominally limits that discretion to mean that the identification
of competent authorities and administrative arrangements
should result in effective river basin management throughout
the whole river basin. In its first report on the implementation
of the Directive, the European Commission concluded that
most administrative arrangements appear ostensibly capable
of ensuring proper implementation of the Directive. However,
commission findings concerning the coordination arrangements
between different authorities within the member states were
inconclusive (EC 2007). Coordination at the international
scale seems lacking as well; the Commission reported that
despite international coordination mechanisms in place in
many international river basin districts, only a few member
states reported using them to coordinate their monitoring
programs, indicating weak horizontal information flow (EC
2009a).
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Meaningful public participation
Another institutional element of EU water management is
strong focus on public participation (EC 2002), which is
supposed to improve decision making and legitimacy
(Arnstein 1969, Alexander 2002, Walker et al. 2002). Article
14 obliges member states to inform and consult the public
when defining goals, making plans, and adopting measures
(Van Rijswick 2011). This requires transparency and a clear
explanation of the proposed measures (EC 2007). Similar
disclosure and participation requirements apply to the results
of risk assessment and the proposed measures for dealing with
flooding risk as follows from the directive on the management
of flood risks.
The European Commission is not the sole enforcer of
compliance; private citizens can also bring cases before the
national courts of member states. National legal systems must
guarantee that citizens enjoy the full protection offered by EU
law. In particular, when a directive offers rights to citizens,
these rights have to be implemented in binding legislation, and
citizens must be assured of their right to bring cases before
national courts (Jans et al. 2007). This approach grants EU
law at least the same footing as national law (the principle of
equivalence) and in some circumstance even higher (the
principle of effectiveness), and it makes EU law more
powerful and effective than international law (Hey and Van
Rijswick 2011). However, some fear that the shift to a
programmatic, more flexible approach in European water
policy will negatively impact the effectiveness of private
enforcement (Krämer 2008). Further, the Janecek decision, a
case regarding a harmed private citizen’s right to have an air
quality action plan drawn up, illustrates the risk that citizens
who are directly concerned by threatened noncompliance with
environmental quality objectives cannot enforce the timely
achievement of these objectives. Instead, private action can
only ensure that states draw up plans with measures capable
of achieving the objectives, taking into account the factual
circumstances and the various opposing interests (C-237/07
Dieter Janecek [2008] ECR I-6221). The combination of
competent authorities and administrative arrangements per
river basin district and strong demand for disclosure and public
participation are positive institutional elements of the
Directive. They enable dealing with the specific and changing
circumstances within river basins and with changing societal
needs, thus increasing the adaptive capacity of the system.
Authority to respond to changes across a range of
scenarios
Ecological objectives implement the Directive’s ecological
goal that all surface waters attain at least a good ecological
status by 2015. The benchmark against which this is to be
tested is the best status achievable, the high status, defined as
the biological, chemical, and morphological conditions
associated with no or very low human pressure (Howarth
2006). Reference conditions must be set at the sub-basin level

on the basis of expert ecological advice, as ecological
objectives depend on local circumstances. Assessment of the
quality of a particular water body is based on the extent of
deviation from the reference status. Good status is achieved if
only a slight deviation from high status, undisturbed or pristine
conditions, is present. However, ecologists have criticized the
benchmark against which the attainment of good ecological
status is tested for being unrealistic (e.g., Paganelli et al.
2011).
Although admirable in themselves, ecological objectives
should also be attainable to make a difference from a socialecological resilience perspective (Moss 2008). Expert opinion
on what constitutes the high ecological status of a particular
water body are futile if the implementation measures to
achieve this ideal status ignore local human impacts (Bijker
et al. 2009, Dieperink et al. 2012). A particular water body
may be used for purposes such as transport or cooling that
result in modifications that cannot be easily reversed. From a
societal point of view it may not be feasible or financially
possible to abandon these uses (EC 2003). Perhaps the only
achievable improvement is a limitation of their impact in the
longer term. Likewise, authority to respond to changed
circumstances may not be legitimate if the objectives toward
which the state is acting are unattainable or ill-defined. Not
surprisingly, many member states had severe problems
implementing and administering ecological standards
(Keessen et al. 2010b).
Further, in water management one has to deal with many
uncertainties, and solutions to deal with them must be found
at the European, national, regional, and local level (Dessai and
Hulme 2007, Cosens 2010, Raadgever et. al 2010). Although
the Directive does not explicitly mention adaptation to climate
change, its flexibility allows the use of WFD tools to facilitate
adaptation to any environmental disturbance, including
climate change (EC 2009b). Later water directives and
strategies explicitly include taking measures to adapt to
climate change.
Local capacity building
Because member states implement the WFD as appropriate,
the WFD does not mandate explicit actions to building local
capacity. However, the European Commission has taken steps
to build capacity at the country and river basin scale through
exercises such as intercalibration and stakeholder workshops
or “fitness checks.” To enable states in implementing and
administering ecological standards, the Directive prescribed
an intercalibration exercise to harmonize the understanding of
good ecological status and facilitate the establishment of
ecological objectives and their achievement. Member states
were placed into 14 intercalibration groups that share
ecologically similar rivers, lakes, and coastal/transitional
waters, e.g., northern lakes, Mediterranean rivers, and can thus
compare monitoring results. This resulted in harmonized
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variables and values attached to these variables. The
intercalibration exercise classified water bodies in groups with
an ecological high, good, moderate, and low status to enable
comparison with analogous bodies (EC 2007).
Local social and economic aspects are not taken into account
in the process of setting ecological objectives, but member
states can subsequently justify not meeting the ecological
objectives under one of the WFD exemptions, such as force
majeure or new sustainable development, resulting in either
deadline extension or relaxed objectives. The flexibility of the
WFD ensures that the ambitious ecological aims can be made
compatible with human impacts by allowing member states
to justify failing to obtain good ecological status (EC 2009c).
These exemptions must be included in the river basin
management plan and are subject to disclosure and public
participation obligations. This ensures that locals and interest
groups have input and can provide decision makers with local
knowledge. Moreover, the European Commission may only
accept an exemption in situations that fit the conditions of the
four explicit exemptions of the WFD: postponement of the
deadline for meeting the objectives, lowering the objectives,
force majeure, and new sustainable developments. A
proportionality test and an assessment of costs and benefits
are among the conditions for the invocation of an exemption
(Brouwer et al. 2005). Exemptions are a mechanism of last
resort whereby all affordable and practically feasible measures
must be taken before invocation is justified.
Monitoring and system feedback
Proper reaction to disturbance is especially challenging if the
causes and ecological or societal effects are uncertain.
Therefore, Article 5 of the Directive requires member states
to assess the physical characteristics, impacts of human
activities on surface waters and groundwater, and of the
economics of water use for each river basin district or for the
portion of an international river basin district falling within its
territory (Brouwer et al. 2005). As such, analysis of the
physical condition of river basins and the impact of human
activities is combined with an obligation to establish programs
for the monitoring of water status to establish a coherent and
comprehensive overview of the qualitative and quantitative
water status within each river basin district.
As detailed in Annex VI, the monitoring program must not
only cover chemical and ecological quality elements but also
the volume and level or rate of flow to the extent relevant for
the ecological and chemical status of surface water. For
groundwater, such programs must monitor the chemical and
quantitative status, i.e., recharge and abstraction rates, to
protect this valuable resource from overexploitation. For
protected areas, the monitoring programs are supplemented
by specifications following the legislation on the basis of
which they acquired their protective status. This means that
for a protected natural area, e.g., a forest or a swamp, specific

water objectives follow from the nature conservation
objectives established by the nature management plan for the
area.
The monitoring data are used to update the river basin
management plans in a six-year planning cycle. In addition,
Article 11 (5) provides that monitoring and additional data
must be used to evaluate whether the objectives for the current
planning period will be achieved. If data reveal that the
objectives for the current planning period will not be timely
met, the causes of the possible failure must be investigated
and intermediate revision of measures may be required. The
relevant permits must be examined and reviewed as
appropriate, the monitoring programs must be reviewed and
adjusted as appropriate, and additional measures may be
necessary to achieve the objectives. Additional measures may
include the establishment of stricter environmental quality
standards. To enable commission supervision, the monitoring
data must be reported to the Commission three years after the
publication of each river basin management plan or update
(Article 11 and 15 (3)). Interim reports describe progress in
the implementation of the planned program of measures. The
Commission uses the national reports to analyze the status of
WFD implementation for the whole European Union.
If monitoring results midway through the planning period
show that goals and standards will not be timely achieved,
plans and programs must be revised. However, it is unknown
to what extent this actually happens. The first generation of
plans and programs date from 2009 and expire in 2015. In the
meantime, new plans and programs have to be drafted to cover
the next planning period that lasts from 2015 until 2021. This
six-year planning cycle nominally facilitates learning and
enables adaptive water management. Unfortunately, it also
enables the member states to postpone the realization of the
goals and objectives at least until the third planning cycle has
ended in 2027 because the WFD allows states to invoke the
exemption of extension of time limits until then (Keessen et
al. 2008, Howarth 2009). It is not fully clear to what extent
plans and programs of measures may or must be changed
during the planning period. It appears, as mentioned above,
from the text of the Directive that changes must be made if
monitoring reveals that the goals as set out in the plan will not
be met without additional measures. However, member states
may in these circumstances also be entitled to invoke an
exemption.
Although every social-ecological system differs in the time
scale required for effective learning, it is unlikely that updates
on a six-year cycle are appropriate for many, if any, river basins
(Green and Garmestani 2012). The Directive provides for a
general obligation to act in that member states must prevent
further deterioration and enhance protection and improvement
of the aquatic environment through the establishment of river
basin management plans. However, these are only general
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terms, and Article 4 allows for inaction through the invocation
of exemptions. These exemptions, which may also be invoked
when intermediate monitoring results suggest taking
additional measures, can entrench institutional inertia against
taking intermediate adaptation measures. Without robust
enforcement or incentive to adapt, member states may be
unlikely to change course in response to monitoring data.
Enforcement
Serving flexibility and regional differentiation is positive, but
at the same time, the legal system must have “teeth” at the
scale of the European Commission if the Directive is to
improve river basin management and be effective in the end.
For chemical objectives, the key is to set enforceable
standards, i.e., thresholds, for the most hazardous substances
at the supranational scale but allow for novelty and innovation
in the manner in which member states meet those standards.
This raises the question of how enforcement of standards not
set at EU level can be made equally effective. The available
oversight mechanisms of monitoring and reporting of
compliance with chemical standards are expected to achieve
compliance with chemical standards set by member states.
That leaves the question whether the same approach is
effective with novel ecological standards that are set by
member states.
The extent of the enforceability of ecological objectives
remains controversial. When the Commission proposed the
Directive, the Council fought with the European Parliament
about the legal status of these objectives (Kaika 2003). Debates
concerned whether the good status obligations were
obligations of best effort or obligations of result. An obligation
of best effort is less far reaching than an obligation of result,
especially in cases where the result of good surface water status
is not achieved. If a member state put forth its best effort but
still did not achieve good status, their legal obligation would
still be met under the best effort obligation. By contrast, under
a results obligation, a member state could put forth a best effort
but still fail to meet its obligation if that best effort did not
result in good status. Despite a change in formulation, from
“in order to achieve” to “with the aim of achieving,” the Court
of Justice will have the final say in the qualification of the
good status obligations. Because the 2015 deadline for
compliance with the WFD goals is fast approaching, one can
take cue from a case in which Luxembourg was condemned
for not timely and correctly having transposed WFD goals into
binding national law (ECJ case C-32/05, Commission vs
Luxembourg [2006], ECR I-11323). This condemnation
suggests that the WFD ecological obligations qualify as
obligations of result, which would bode well for water quality
(Van Kempen, in press).
In case of transboundary disputes, riparian states can ask the
European Commission to mediate. However, the Commission
does not have binding dispute settlement powers because of
the absence of a legal basis in the Directive for commission

arbitration (Keessen et al. 2008). Consequently, disputes have
to be solved amicably or through infringement proceedings
brought before the European Court of Justice. Although EU
member states can take each other to court over disputes if
they suspect an infringement of EU law, in practice they rarely
make use of this power. They may not seek arbitration instead
because the European Court of Justice has established in its
case law that international arbitration is not allowed over
disputes involving the interpretation or application of EU law
(Keessen et al 2008, Hey and Van Rijswick 2011). Thus, the
attainability of the WFD goals also relies on the willingness
of the Commission to bring proceedings before the European
Court of Justice against states that do not comply with their
obligations.
Synthesis
Meeting the WFD objectives on time is unlikely; the first
commission report on the implementation of the Directive
revealed that the percentage of water bodies actually meeting
all objectives is very low, in some member states as dismally
low as 1% (EC 2007). Most water bodies are at risk for not
complying before 2015. Many high risk water bodies are
located in densely populated areas and regions of intensive,
often unsustainable, water use (EC 2007). Another factor is
whether a member state had made the necessary investments
to comply with previous EU water law, which addressed
pollution by domestic waste water discharges, nutrients from
agriculture, and industrial discharges (EC 2007). Currently,
the most significant and widespread pressures are diffuse
pollution, physical degradation of water ecosystems, and,
particularly in Southern Europe, overexploitation of water (EC
2007).
Striking the right balance between flexibility and
enforceability is particularly important for transboundary
European rivers like the Danube, Meuse, and Rhine, where
member states are collectively responsible for attaining goals.
However, because of the EU legal system, each member state
is only liable for meeting the chemical and ecological
objectives in its own part of the river basin. Under the
Directive, member states are only obliged to discuss their river
basin management plans and programs of measures in
international river basin committee meetings and to attempt
to coordinate overarching management plans and programs of
measures. The available instruments to realize this cooperation
are traditional international treaties between riparian states,
which do not offer a proper legal system to enforce shared
responsibilities (Van Rijswick et al. 2010, Hey and Van
Rijswick 2011, Green and Perrings 2014). Administrative
cooperation between the various authorities and states
involved therefore only proceeds on a weak legal or voluntary
basis.
A trend toward regional water authorities is emerging,
following the traditions of France, Spain, Flanders, and the
Netherlands, although these water authorities differ in task,
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legal status, and competencies (Van Rijswick et al. 2010).
Thus, the practical elaboration of these institutional elements
may differ considerably between member states, restricting
cooperative transboundary management of river basins (Van
Rijswick et al. 2010), thus limiting the effectiveness of
multilevel governance. Furthermore, the interests of all actors,
private or public, may be contradictory. Common goals and
necessary measures may prove difficult to define and to realize
when so many opposing interests are at stake.
The flexibility of the Directive permits so much policy
discretion to member states that implementation can differ
considerably from member state to member state (Keessen et
al. 2008). Interviews with civil servants involved in the
implementation and questionnaires completed by legal experts
from various member states revealed that member states adopt
different approaches (Keessen et al. 2010b). Such discretion
creates the risk that unambitious national practices inspired
by an unambitious interpretation of the vague wording of the
Directive will lead to a lack of practical effectiveness (Moss
2008, Howarth 2009, Keessen et al. 2010b). In transboundary
river basins, this may lead to conflict should an ambitious
state’s efforts be weakened by an unambitious riparian
neighbor state and affect the overall result (Odom and Wolf
2011). In particular, attainment of ecological aims may be
imperiled because achieving those goals often requires
transboundary cooperation. For instance, the objective of
facilitating fish migration between headwater streams and
marine waters requires measures like fish ladders to be
established on the whole river basin otherwise the measures
are useless.
CONCLUSION
We have analyzed the Water Framework Directive from the
perspective of resilience science. The Directive provides an
interesting venue for the exploration and application of
resilience principles, especially panarchy and adaptive
governance. Although the Directive was not specifically
crafted with principles from resilience thinking, it is important
to assess the potential effectiveness of the Directive in light
of the realities associated with managing social-ecological
systems. The WFD provides a sound example of multiple
overlapping levels of control with one level of strong
coordination at the relevant social-ecological scale; by shifting
from state-centered governance to management at the
environmentally appropriate scale, i.e., river basins, the
Directive challenges conventional notions of political
geography. Collectively determining the proper environmental
objectives at the supranational scale then handing off design
and implementation to local institutions could serve as a sound
model for scale appropriate environmental management. This
structure also facilitates horizontal and vertical information
flow, especially in transboundary basins, and empowers states
with the authority to respond to changing scenarios. The
degree to which states empower citizens through meaningful

public participation and building local capacity is largely
dependent on the implementation at the state scale, and thus
difficult to evaluate at the supranational scale, even though
the Directive encourages public participation.
However, inadequate implementation and enforcement
provides an opening whereby unambitious member states and
local entities may exploit the Directive’s inherent flexibility
and fail to meet the objectives of the Directive. Likewise, the
Directive’s six-year monitoring and revision structure is
inadequate for continuous learning and adaptation. Even if
member states conduct vigorous monitoring, the monitoring
results are useless without an iterative adaptation mechanism.
Managing for resilience requires system feedback in real time,
not every six years, or longer if exemptions are invoked, and
thus this aspect of the Directive is in need of reform. In
particular, the potential reliance on exemptions, which may
be invoked when intermediate monitoring results suggest
taking additional measures, can entrench institutional inertia
against taking adaptation measures. Without robust
enforcement or incentive to adapt, member states may be
unlikely to change course in response to monitoring data.
Balancing the need for regulatory flexibility to achieve
environmental objectives with enough certainty and
enforcement to ensure performance plagues the application of
resilience principles in many circumstances (Benson and
Garmestani 2011b). In this case, it seems the European Union
has failed to strike the right balance by granting too much
weight to flexibility without the necessary counterweight to
monitoring feedback and enforcement to ensure achievement
of good status objectives. Thus, to manage for resilience, the
Directive requires reform in its feedback and enforcement
regimes.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/5357
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